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Abstrak
Efektivitas bantuan luar negeri memiliki posisi sentral dalam perdebatan di kajian pembangunan
dan, khususnya, di antara komunitas pembuat kebijakan luar negeri. Mengingat posisi unik Belanda
sebagai donor yang berfokus pada kebutuhan resipien, menelaah praktik bantuan luar negeri
Belanda menjadi penting, terutama mengenai ambiguitas tujuan bantuannya ke Bangladesh. Artikel
ini mempertanyakan, “pada batas apa ambiguitas tujuan bantuan luar negeri Belanda memengaruhi
efektivitas bantuan luar negeri Belanda ke Bangladesh?” Pertanyaan tersebut dijawab melalui
komparasi terhadap periode 2005-2010 dan 2011-2016. Analisis didasarkan pada penilaian
terhadap official development aid (ODA) Belanda ke Bangladesh dan persetujuan koalisi Belanda.
Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa di periode ke dua, ambiguitas tujuan meningkat, sementara
efektivitas bantuan di sektor-sektor yang dianalisis telah berkurang. Meskipun komparasi di antara
masing-masing periode cenderung belum kuat, terdapat bukti bahwa ambiguitas tujuan berperan
terhadap penurunan efektivitas. Dengan demikian, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa efektivitas
bantuan di Bangladesh mengalami pengurangan di periode 2011-2016 dengan meningkatnya
ambiguitas tujuan yang disebabkan oleh meningkatnya kepentingan Belanda dalam kebijakan ODA.

Kata kunci:
bantuan luar negeri, bantuan pembangungan, ambiguitas tujuan, Belanda, Bangladesh

Abstract
Aid effectiveness has been situated in the central debate of development studies and, particularly,
among foreign aid policy making community. As the Netherlands was one of the unique countries
which focused extensively on the needs of its recipient, it is important to investigate the Netherlands’
recent practice of its development aid, particularly to Bangladesh and the associated goal
ambiguity. This article attempts to answer the question, “to what extent does goal ambiguity in
Dutch development aid affect the effectiveness of Dutch development aid given to Bangladesh?”
This analysis is based on independent assessments of Dutch official development aid (ODA) to
Bangladesh and Dutch coalition agreements in 2005-2010 and 2011-2016. This study finds that, in
the second period, goal ambiguity has increased, while the aid effectiveness has decreased. This
change is unlikely to be attributed to the conditions for aid effectiveness since these remained
largely stable or even in slightly in favour of the second period. While the comparison of different
sectors between timeframes lacks full robustness, there is direct evidence that goal ambiguity has
played a role in lower effectiveness in the water related aid in the second period. Therefore, this
study suggests that aid effectiveness in Bangladesh has decreased in the period 2011 to 2016 due to
an increase in goal ambiguity caused by increasing self-interests in Dutch ODA policy.

Keywords:
foreign aid, development aid, goal ambiguity, Netherlands, Bangladesh
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, foreign aid has been an important feature in the contemporary
debate on foreign policy. Foreign aid has been inextricably related with how state actors
instrumentalise their foreign policy to essentially reduce poverty and support developing
countries’ development (Ying, 2002; Virgianita, 2011). The debate goes beyond
whether official development assistance (sometimes called official development aid,
development aid, foreign aid, etc.) is only an extension of states’ desire to politically
expand their influence or soft power. Among scholars, there is no general consensus
that development aid is effective (Apodaca, 2017; Easterly, 2006; Easterly, 2008;
Lancaster, 2007; Sachs, 2005). The current debate, nonetheless, still sits on the problem
of effectiveness of foreign aid. Assessing the effectiveness of aid is extremely difficult,
according to Bigsten, Gunning and Tarp (2006). Most studies about effectiveness do not
clearly define their definition of effectiveness. Although effectiveness is a highly
relevant concept that is somewhat clear to most, an overall accepted definition is absent.
From a different body of literature, that of global prohibition regimes, Getz (2006, pp.
248) proposes, “that effectiveness is, first and foremost, a function of the problem being
addressed”. Therefore, it is significant to further the discussion on development aid’s
effectiveness through empirical assessment, such as examining state actor’s practice on
development aid. This study will focus on the Netherlands.
Historically, the Netherlands was a donor of development aid that was known
for its focus on the needs of the recipient country (Olsen, 1998), but this has changed.
Since Prime Minister Rutte came into power in 2010, multiple non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) have voiced their concerns about the new direction of Dutch
foreign aid (Oxfam Novib, 2016; Keultjes, 2018). Oxfam Novib (2016) worries that the
Dutch aid policy has focused more on self-interests since then. It fears that this ‘selfinterested’ policy change has created a conflict of interest that might harm the
effectiveness of Dutch development aid. When goals conflict or when they are unclear,
one can speak of goal ambiguity. In a different policy field–the public administration
literature–it has indeed been shown that goal ambiguity might decrease the effectiveness
of a policy (Leune, 2007). However, it has not been extensively empirically researched
in the development aid literature. Thus, it remains to be seen if goal ambiguity has
negative consequences on aid effectiveness as well. Up until now, however, the
relationship between goal ambiguity and aid effectiveness has not been researched
thoroughly. Nevertheless, there has already been some speculation outside the field of
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science. Ban Ki-moon, the former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, addressed
the Bretton Woods1 institutions with this following statement: “All too often, aid is
driven more by politics than by need, undermining its effectiveness” (Ban, 2007, pp. 1).
The policy change in 2010 included a reduction in the number of aid recipient
countries. From the previous 33, 15 eventually remained (OECD, 2012). One of those
countries is Bangladesh, which has recently become a middle-income country (World
Bank, 2018a; World Bank, 2018b). If the previously voiced concerns about the Dutch
aid policy shift hold true, then these effects could be examined by studying Bangladesh
before and after 2010. Therefore, this research will focus on the period six years before
the policy change and the period 6 years immediately after. By comparing those two
periods, the possible causal relation between goal ambiguity and aid effectiveness can
be tested.
The purpose of this article is to evaluate the relationship that goal ambiguity
policy might have with the effectiveness of the aid. This is done to incorporate insights
from the public administration literature into the aid effectiveness literature, by
introducing the concept of goal ambiguity and its effects, which adds to the existing
Policy Coherence for Development framework. This coincides with another goal of this
research, namely to evaluate the effects of the policy change introduced under the Dutch
People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy’s (VVD) Prime Minister Mark Rutte’s first
cabinet in 2010 and the cabinet Rutte II that followed. The main question is, therefore:
“To what extent does goal ambiguity in Dutch development aid affect the effectiveness
of Dutch development aid given to Bangladesh?” To answer that research question, this
article utilises goal ambiguity as the main framework of analysis. This article focuses on
multiple secondary sources. These mainly include scientific articles, parliamentary
papers, policy reviews, and independent evaluations of Dutch aid made by the Dutch
Policy and Operations Department (abbreviated as IOB in Dutch) and the OECD. The
structure is as follows, first the analytical framework will be set out, then the
methodology will be discussed, and followed by the results in the discussion. The article
closes of with a conclusion, including remarks on further research and policy
implications.
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ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Official Development Assistance
The OECD defines Official Development Assistance (abbreviated as ODA and used
interchangeably in this article with aid) as “government aid that promotes and
specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries.”
(OECD, 2018a, pp. 1). This assistance is in the form of resource flows to the recipient
countries, territories, and multilateral development institutions (OECD, 2018a). The
selection of eligible countries to receive ODA changes over time and it depends on their
per capita income (OECD, 2018a). The OECD has also made a more specific definition:
“ODA is the resource flows to countries and territories on the DAC List of ODA
Recipients (…) and to multilateral development institutions that are:
i. Provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by
their executive agencies; and
ii. Concessional (i.e. grants and soft loans) and administered with the promotion
of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as the main
objective.” (OECD, 2018a, pp. 1).

This definition has recently been altered. In 2014, it was agreed upon that only grants
and those parts of concessional loans (loans with a lower than market interest rate or
with a longer payback time) that are similar to a grant in nature are considered as ODA.
However, this was only imposed for the ODA figures from 2018 and onwards, with the
earliest OECD numbers being released by this more stringent definition in early 2019
(OECD, 2018a). It is important to notice that this research will only use data from
before 2018 (which was based on the old definition of ODA).
ODA can be further classified in sub-categories. ODA can differ in terms of time
and the number of donor countries involved. With respect to the former, one can
distinguish between aid that focuses on the short-term (emergency aid) and aid focuses
on the long-term (structural aid). With respects to the latter dimension—that of the
number of donor countries involved—one usually makes the distinction between
bilateral aid (meaning one donor country and one recipient country) and multilateral aid
(two or more donor countries and one or more recipient countries). Sometimes aid is
called multilateral and bilateral at the same time, abbreviated as multi-bi aid. Aid is
labelled as such when it is earmarked and given by one donor country using a
290
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multilateral aid programme (OECD, 2015). There are more reports on structural aid than
on emergency aid. Therefore, this research will focus on the structural aid that the
Netherlands has given to Bangladesh. In addition, the Netherlands supports Bangladesh
with both multilateral and bilateral ODA and they are both included in aid assessments.
Therefore, both are examined in this article.
Lastly, one can make the distinction between tied and untied aid. Tied aid is
defined as “official grants or loans that limit procurement to companies in the donor
country or in a small group of countries” while untied aid is simply all other aid that is
not bound by this criterion and it can thus be spent more freely (OECD, 2018c, pp. 1).
Tied aid has been under fire for many years because the costs of development projects
can increase by as much as 15% to 30% when it is in the form of tied aid instead of
untied aid (OECD, 2018c). The international community has made efforts to reduce the
amount of tied aid because of this (OECD, 2012). Unfortunately, progress towards this
goal has been slower than expected (OECD, 2012). Tied aid also seems to put selfinterests above selfless-interests, thereby contradicting a criterion of ODA, namely that
helping the recipient country is the main objective (OECD, 2018a). Unfortunately,
specific numbers of tied aid (to Bangladesh) are not available; therefore, this will not be
a part of this research.

Effectiveness of ODA
According to the OECD (2007, pp. 9) the measure of effectiveness differs depending on
whom you ask: “For countries that receive foreign aid, it means allocating resources to
their policy priorities and plans to promote justice, stimulate economic growth and
improve social welfare for their citizens”. However, as outlined above, the goal of
helping recipient countries should be the main objective of ODA (OECD, 2018a). There
are various ways of obtaining this goal and different methods (and types of aid) have
different effects for the recipient country. A recent literature assessment by McGillivray
et al. (2006) shows that there is much debate about the effectiveness of aid and the
conditions that shape it. Factors that claim to be a condition for aid are often contested.
Up to date, the following factors have been reported to influence aid effectiveness: the
climatic conditions, the amount of political stability, the level of economic growth, the
geographical location, and the policy environment (see the causal model below in
Figure 1).
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Concerning the climatic conditions, Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) find that
worse climatic conditions (i.e., the frequent occurrence of natural disasters) result in
better aid effectiveness. This is somewhat unexpected. They explain this by giving the
hypothesis that aid mitigates effects of natural disasters, therefore making aid more
effective in a country with many natural disasters than in a country with fewer natural
disasters. Political stability may also play a role in aid effectiveness. To be more
precise, more political stability creates a better condition for aid to be effective (Chauvet
& Guillaumont, 2002). Another condition for effective aid is economic growth.
Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2003) have found that aid is only effective when there
is a GNP growth of 2% or higher in a given year.2 In their model, aid has no effect on
development when that threshold is not reached. Others have found that the geography
of a country can exert influence on the effectiveness of aid. Dalgaard et al. (2004) stated
that aid given to countries with jungle (i.e., countries in the tropics) has lower
effectiveness than aid given to other countries. The geography, however, will not be
operationalised because, even though, Dalgaard et al. (2004) have found a statistically
significant relation between geography and aid effectiveness, it seems highly unlikely
that this is caused by the geography of a country itself. This is even what Dalgaard et al.
(2004) admit themselves. More probably, it is not a condition for effective aid but rather
a factor that strongly correlates with one that is. While it could still be potentially
meaningful to include a proxy variable, like geography, into an analysis of a crosscountry comparison, for an intra-country comparison like this study where the country’s
borders have not significantly changed, the proxy variable would not add anything to
this qualitative analysis since it would stay the same. Finally, a good policy
environment can also increase aid’s effectiveness (Burnside & Dollar 1997, 2000;
Kaufmann & Kraay, 2002). The research from Burnside and Dollar (1997; 2000) has
been critiqued by Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2004) who used their dataset but
extended it and found no statistical significance. On the other hand, Kaufmann and
Kraay (2002) used other indicators to measure a good policy environment, namely those
of the World Bank, and found a statistically significant effect that to the best of the
author’s knowledge has not been disproven. Thus, a country’s policy environment does
matter for aid effectiveness. Finally, the many factors that influence ODA’s
effectiveness analysed above will form an integral part of this research.
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Policy Coherence for Development
Policy coherence is a term originating from the public administration literature, but it
can also be applied in the field of development aid. For development aid, a specific
approach has been developed called Policy Coherence for Development (PCD). There
are multiple definitions of this concept. Experts in the field of aid define PCD as
follows: “Policy Coherence for Development means working to ensure that the
objectives and results of a government’s (or institution’s) development policies are not
undermined by other policies of that government (or institution), which impact on
developing countries, and that these other policies support development objectives,
where feasible.” (OECD, 2005, pp. 28). The concept was created to generate better
input, output, outcome, and impact results (Picciotto, 2005b). This research will focus
on improving the output level, Picciotto (2005b, pp. 148) defined this as “to minimise
the negative impact on developing countries of policy initiatives taken to achieve
domestic goals”. In other words, in the PCD framework, non-aid policies and aid
policies of the donor country should not interfere with each other in such a way that it
reduces the development outcomes of the donor country’s policies.
The PCD approach consists of multiple dimensions (Picciotto, 2005a). The first
dimension is that of internal coherence. This is about the consistency of goals and
objectives, modalities, and protocols of a donor government’s aid. The second
dimension is called the intra-country coherence, and this is defined as the consistency of
aid and non-aid policies of a government to jointly contribute to development. The third
dimension is called the inter-donor coherence and is described as the consistency of aid
and non-aid policies of various donor countries in terms of their contribution to
development. The fourth dimension is named donor-recipient coherence. This is about
the consistency of the policies that the donor countries have with the policies of the
recipient country (Picciotto, 2005a). This research will focus on a part of the internal
coherence of the Dutch development policy, namely the consistency of goals and
objectives. This will be taken as the independent variable. For goals to be coherent, they
have to be clearly defined and they must not contradict each other as well. Another way
to describe this is with the concept of goal ambiguity. From the public administration
literature, one can derive that goal ambiguity comes down to leeway in interpretation of
the set goals (Chun & Rainey, 2006). Internal policy coherence of Dutch development
policy can thus be extracted by analysing how much leeway there is in interpreting the
goals of the development aid.
293

Thomas L. Oomen

There can be multiple causes for goal ambiguity. In the case of ODA, an
explanation can be sought in the fact that donor countries also use their aid to help
themselves to a certain extent (Burnside & Dollar, 1997; Berthélemy, 2006) and this can
cause friction with the goal of helping the recipient country develop. That domestic
goals play a role in giving development aid has already been proven by Burnside and
Dollar (1997) and more recently by Berthélemy (2006, pp. 192) who did a study on the
motives of donor countries to give aid. It was concluded that most donors “behave in a
rather egoistic way.” The literature on how much a donor country profits from spending
on ODA varies, but a recent analysis shows that on average every euro spent on ODA
increases exports of the donor country by the same amount (IOB, 2014). Moreover,
donors often select recipient countries based on their trade linkages with those
countries, therefore implying that domestic economic interests play a significant role in
the allocation of aid (Berthélemy, 2006). The conflict between a self-interested goal and
a selfless goal creates goal ambiguity.
Goal ambiguity can have multiple consequences. The selection of goals, for
instance, always influences the selection of the means (WRR, 2004) and when this
happens, a trade-off might be created between the different goals. In the case of aid
policy, unless officials, despite the ambiguity of goals, always use their agency to select
aid policy goals to take priority over other goals, goal ambiguity between aid and nonaid policies will likely hurt the effectiveness of ODA. Moreover, Leune (2007)—a
public administration researcher who focused on education—states that for policy to be
effective, it is a requirement to have non-conflicting goals.3 According to him, this does
not always have to be the case, but there is a high chance of policy failure when goals
do conflict. Little research has been done, however, to investigate these effects in the
field of development aid. If goals can be interpreted as conflicting, then there is goal
ambiguity. These effects are accumulated into the causal model and hypothesis of this
paper.
Consequently, the hypothesis in this research is that if there is more focus on
goals focused on advancing Dutch actors’ interests, then because of trade-offs caused by
this goal ambiguity, Dutch development aid will become less effective. The causal
model for this hypothesis is represented in Figure 1. In order to ensure that a change in
effectiveness is not caused by other factors, the climatic conditions, economic growth,
political stability and policy environment will be evaluated as well.
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Figure 1. Causal model
Source: formulated by the author

Operationalisation
The operationalisation of development aid is straightforward. It is a quantitative variable
that can be further dissected into the indicators of ODA and untied aid. ODA is simply
measured by the recorded ODA amount that the Dutch government provides to the
OECD. Not all aid is ODA because sometimes aid does not adhere to the criteria set by
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC). That part of the development
aid of the Netherlands will therefore not be taken into account.
The next concept to operationalise is goal ambiguity. As derived from scientific
literature in the previous section, goal ambiguity is about the vagueness of goals and
about conflicting goals and thus creating leeway in interpretation. This article will focus
on both aspects. Moving on, conflicting goals can be found by analysing the goals
mentioned in coalition agreements. One goal of ODA is always to help the recipient
country. Goals will be seen as conflicting when they go against the interest of the
recipient country, which is Bangladesh.
As mentioned in the previous section, the definition of effectiveness depends on
the perspective one chooses. This research will focus on aid effectiveness from the
perspective of Bangladesh and three indicators are used in order to do so. The first
indicator is ‘attainment of project-specific goals obtained from evaluation reports' and
statements will be searched for as proof of this when they describe a project as
successful, effective, or working as intended. The second indicator is ‘added value of
projects obtained from evaluation reports’. ‘Added value’ means that aid was necessary
to create this project. Thus, when assessments of Dutch aid speak about a project that
could have been done without aid, it will be marked as non-additional. The third
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indicator is ‘successful output of aid’. This is measured by marking statements in
assessments that speak of improvement of living conditions due to the projects.
Based on the literature, external conditions for aid effectiveness are indicated by
the variables of the policy environment of the recipient country, climatic conditions,
political stability, economic growth, and geography. The policy environment will be
based on the world governance indicators: voice and accountability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption from the World
Bank (2018c). The climatic conditions variable is about natural disasters (Guillaumont
& Chauvet, 2001). Therefore, this will be operationalised by the number of natural
disasters and the number of which are labelled as major disasters. These data are
obtained from the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (ADRC; 2018). Political stability
will be operationalised by the world governance indicator called ‘political stability and
absence of violence/terrorism' from the World Bank (2018c). The variable ‘economic
growth’ will be operationalised by using GNP figures from the Bangladesh Bureau of
Statistics (Trading Economics, 2018). As discussed in the theory section, the geography
will not be taken into account and it will therefore not be operationalised. An overview
of the entire operationalisation can be found in Table 1.

Table 1. Operationalisation of key concepts
Concept

Indicator

Operationalisation

Development aid

Official development aid (The
financial means transferred to
recipients that fulfil the criteria of
the OECD DAC)

Amount of ODA recorded in official
documents from the OECD and the Dutch
government

Goal ambiguity as
part of internal
coherence

Conflicting goals

Goals derived from coalition agreements
that require trade-offs between themselves
are labelled as conflicting goals

Unclear goal statements

Goals derived from coalition agreements
that are not concrete enough to be
measured by qualitative or quantitative
means

Attainment of project-specific
goals obtained from evaluation
reports

When assessments describe a project as
successful, effective, or working as
intended

Added value of projects obtained
from evaluation reports

When there is no sign from the
assessments that the project could have
been done without the aid

Successful output of aid

When assessments speak of improvement
of living conditions due to the projects

ODA
effectiveness
Bangladesh
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External
conditions for aid
effectiveness

Policy environment
recipient country

of

the

World governance indicators: voice and
accountability, government effectiveness,
regulatory quality, rule of law, and control
of corruption from the World Bank

Problematic climate

Number of natural disasters and number of
major natural disasters from the Asian
Disasters Reduction Centre

Political stability

World governance indicator from the
World Bank

Economic growth

GNP growth rate calculated from figures
from the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics

Geography

Omitted from this research

Source: formulated by the author

RESEARCH METHOD
This section will explain how the research was conducted and why it was done in this
way. This section first sets out to account for the choices made with regards to the
timeframe and the research design.

Timeframe and Research Design
The timeframe of this research will encase the period ranging from 2005 to 2016. This
is done in order to compare the period before and after 2010. That year a major policy
change took place (OECD, 2012; Oxfam Novib, 2016). This coincides with the first
cabinet of Rutte (PDC, 2018). By comparing the period 2005-2010 that is expected to
have lower goal ambiguity than the period 2011-2016, one can analyse whether this
change in policy coherence has led to higher or lower effectiveness.
The timeframe of this research encompasses six years before and six years after
the major policy change in 2010. Since development projects need a certain time to
materialise their effects (IOB, 2011), a reasonable length is needed to capture the effects
of newly implemented policies as well. A period of six years should be more than
sufficient for this purpose. The reason why 2010 is included in the first period and not
the second period is that the first Cabinet of Rutte was formed at the end of 2010.
Although this was the year in which the policy change was introduced, its policy will
not have been immediately implemented with immediate effects. Consequently, the
periods of 2005-2010 and 2011-2016 make for the most valid comparison.
The research done is based on desk research. Varying operationalisations have
been created for the distinguished concepts. Reports have been selected based on
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availability. Because public assessments reports are scarce, this research will encompass
all reports (or parts thereof) about Bangladesh from IOB and the OECD that specifically
focus on Bangladesh that can be clearly assigned to either 2005-2010 or 2011-2016.

Research Limitations
All possible validity issues from evaluation assessments from IOB and the OECD affect
the validity of this research. IOB, however, has a de jure independence. This also seems
to be the de facto case since there have been instances of sharp criticism towards the
Dutch government, making the cover-up of politically sensitive information or other
validity issues unlikely (Hoebink, 2017). Unfortunately, at the time of writing for this
article, the Dutch government has (possibly temporarily) taken down some of the links
to the documents. The author of this research still has the majority of these reports
locally stored and these are available upon request. The research design makes use of
coding in order to ensure the validity of this research.
There are some limitations to this research. This research has been faced with
various research problems. Most notably is the scarcity of reports about Dutch aid to
Bangladesh. The Netherlands pays tens of millions of euros a year on ODA for
Bangladesh and as such, it would seem logical to evaluate such large sums of money on
a regular basis. Yet, this does not seem to be the case. Partially, this can be explained by
the fact that some evaluations are not made public. This, however, does not provide a
full explanation since even OECD and IOB, of whom one expects to have access to
those documents, are commenting on the low amount of evaluations and the lack of data
(OECD, 2012, 2017; IOB, 2011, 2013a, 2013b). This is an interesting finding in and of
itself, but at the same time, it also limits the validity of this research. There are very few
evaluations about Bangladesh in the period of 2005-2010. Assessments of aid for
education and sexual health, however, do exist. Therefore, these are used as data
sources. In the time slot 2011-2016, an evaluation report about aid for sexual health is
also used. Unfortunately, there is no assessment of educational aid in this period, but
there is a report on aid related to the water sector. Though these sectors are not
comparable, to the extent that research is possible, the results of these sectors,
education, sexual health, and water together, provide the best indication as to how goal
ambiguity effects aid effectiveness.
Fortunately, the sectors included in this research represent a significant share of
Dutch aid to Bangladesh in the researched timeframe. Concerning the first period, aid
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for education took up a large share of Dutch aid to Bangladesh–up to 25%4 in the first
period (IOB, 2011; OECD, 2018d). Unfortunately, essential figures for sexual health aid
are entirely missing in this period and its share could thus not be calculated. In the
second period, expenditures of Dutch aid to Bangladesh per sector are missing as well,
except for 2016. In that year, 43%5 of aid to Bangladesh went to better water
management (MFA, 2017a; OECD, 2018d) and 18% went to sexual health aid (MFA,
2017b; OECD, 2018d).6 It is not certain if these percentages have shifted over time.
Thus, somewhere around 25% of aid has been evaluated in the first period and
somewhere around 61% has been evaluated in the second period.

DISCUSSION
In this section, the results of this research will be described. This section is divided into
three parts. The first part explains how the conditions for effective aid have changed
between 2005 and 2016. The second part is about the changes in aid effectiveness in this
period. The third part elaborates on that goal ambiguity might have had.

Conditions for Aid Effectiveness in Bangladesh
Looking at the first of the aid effectiveness conditions, one can see that the policy
environment of Bangladesh has improved minimally when comparing the time periods
of 2005-2010 with 2011-2016 (see Table 2 for the averages). Most change has happened
in the control of corruption in which Bangladesh almost doubled its world ranking. The
regulatory quality and the rule of law in Bangladesh have increased, but only to a small
extent. On average, there is an increase of about two percentile ranks. Due to the high
error margin, however, these results should be conservatively interpreted. Burnside and
Dollar (1997, 2000) state that a better policy environment leads to better aid
effectiveness. Thus, while it seems that the period 2011-2016 has better conditions for
aid effectiveness, it is more appropriate to state that the policy environment has
remained stable and that this is not in the benefit of either two periods.
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Table 2. Policy environment7
2005 to 2010 average
percentile rank (1 to
100)

2011 to 2016 average
percentile rank (1 to
100)

Voice and
accountability

33.50

33.33

-0.17

Government
effectiveness

24.17

24.17

0

Regulatory quality

18.50

20.17

+1.67

Rule of law

21.17

24.17

+3

Control of corruption

10.67

19.17

+8.5

Average of these
indicators

18.00

20.17

+2.17

Change

Source: the data are from World Bank (2018c).

Concerning the climate, this does not change in a few years. However, there can
be a difference in the number of natural disasters. These play a role in aid effectiveness
because they can have severe consequences for a country and aid can mitigate those
damages, therefore becoming more effective. Thus, looking at the number of natural
disasters remains relevant. The data from the Asian Disaster Reduction Centre show
that in the period of 2005-2010, 33 natural disasters occurred in Bangladesh (ADRC,
2018). Of these 33, two were classified as major natural disasters. In the period of 20112016, 17 natural disasters occurred, which is about half of the period before.
Furthermore, none of these natural disasters was classified as a major natural disaster. In
line with conclusions from Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), more natural disasters
leave more room for aid to counteract development disturbances and thus be more
effective. Therefore, the period of 2005-2010 better fulfils this condition than the period
of 2011-2016.
Political stability is somewhat higher in the second period than in the first (see
Table 3 for the averages). In 2014, political stability reached its highest point and in
2005, it was at its lowest (World Bank, 2018c). However, the error margin in all of
these years is quite large (World Bank, 2018c); therefore, these results should be
conservatively interpreted. Labelling political stability as stable over the two periods is,
therefore, more appropriate in this case. Thus, neither of these two time slots better
fulfils the criterion of Chauvet and Guillaumont (2002).
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Table 3. Political stability8

Political stability and
absence of
violence/terrorism

2005 to 2010 average
percentile rank

2011 to 2016 average
percentile rank

8.50

10.67

Change
+2.17

Source: the data are from World Bank (2018c).

The fourth condition is related to economic growth. It states that aid only has an
effect if the GNP growth is about 2% (Gomanee et al., 2003). Figures from the
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (Trading Economics, 2018) were used to calculate the
GNP growth per year. This has resulted in the finding that for the most part of 2005 to
2016, Bangladesh has had high GNP growth. In most years, there was a growth rate of
about 6%. All years except for the year 2009 meet the 2% GNP growth rate threshold as
described by Gomanee et al. (2003). In that year, there was a negative GNP change of
1.99%. By not meeting the threshold, it might have reduced the effectiveness of aid in
that year. Without a doubt, it can be concluded that the second period better fulfilled the
condition of economic growth because none of the years in that period failed to meet the
economic threshold. Based on this condition, one would expect that the period 20112016 would have higher aid effectiveness than the period 2005-2010 because of the
underperforming year of 2009. Consequently, three of the four conditions for aid
effectiveness are best fulfilled in the period of 2011-2016. An overview of the results
can be seen in Table 4.
Table 4. Overview of Conditions That Improve Aid Effectiveness
External
conditions for
aid effectiveness

2005 to 2010

2011 to 2016

Conditions best
fulfilled in

Policy
environment

Total average percentile of
18.00a

Total average percentile of
20.17a

2011 to 2016d

Problematic
climate

33 natural disasters of
which 2 are major disastersb

17 natural disasters of which
none is a major disasterb

2005 to 2010

Political stability

Average of 8.5 percentilea

Average of 10.67 percentilea

2011 to 2016d

Economic
growth

2009 below the thresholdc

No year below the thresholdc

2011 to 2016

Noted These changes are within the error margin and should therefore be interpreted especially
cautiously. They only give an indication, not a definitive result.
Source: data are sourced from World Bank (2018c)a, ADRC (2018)b, and Trading Economics
(2018)c
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Changes in Aid Effectiveness
Overall, the report by IOB (2011) gives strong indicators for high effectiveness of
Dutch educational aid in the period of 2005-2010. Bangladesh was one of the largest
recipients of aid for education from the Netherlands (IOB, 2011). Many project-specific
goals are obtained, there is added value, and there is a successful output of aid as well
(IOB, 2011). One of the major programmes during the period of 2005-2010 is called
PEDP-II9 and “The evaluation finds that the classroom environment at GPS
[government primary school] and RNGPS [registered non-governmental primary
school] has definitely improved as a result of key PEDP-II interventions” (IOB, 2011,
pp. 19). Additionally, the aid for education has led to a higher net enrolment rate from
68% in 2005 to 81% in 2009 (IOB, 2011). School attendance went up as well from 77%
in 2005 to 83.5% in 2010 (ADB, 2010). Higher primary school completion rates were
also noted in the aid for education assessment from IOB (2011). Moreover, in another
report, the cooperation between the Dutch and Bengali organisations in aid for
education was described as having reached good results in a short timespan (MFA,
2009). Besides, the projects were mainly focused on free or cheap service delivery and
training which would not have been financed by a private investor. Thus, aid for
education is not only effective to a large extent, but it is also of added value. With
regards to the project-specific goals, however, not all goals have been reached. The IOB
(2011) report also mentions remaining problems in the education sector, such as low
contact hours and equity of access for the poorest. With respect to the former, this may
be because “Further changes in classroom teaching and learning practices (...) will take
time to materialise [sic].” (IOB, 2011, pp. 20).
In the field of sexual health aid in the years 2005 to 2010, the IOB seems to
indicate that in general, it is effective. In multiple fields, there have been significant
improvements due to the Dutch aid. The amount of labour under the care of a schooled
obstetrician in Bangladesh doubled in 2004 to 2011 from 16% to 32%, which can be
partly attributed to the Dutch aid received (IOB, 2013b). Likewise, much progress has
been made in the use of contraceptives, which rose from 40% in 2000 to 57% in
2011(IOB, 2013b). Moreover, “Dutch support to an initiative for improving the
government programme to prevent unsafe abortion in Bangladesh was proven
effective.” (IOB, 2013b, pp. 17). Failed projects or underperforming ones are not
mentioned in an overview of the most important results (IOB, 2013c). Although these
findings discuss changes up to 2011 instead of 2010, it can be appropriately attributed to
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the period 2005 to 2010 to be used in this research because the majority of the effects
take place in this timeframe. Additionally, this form of free service delivery would not
have been provided to the same extent as it is now without the Dutch aid. Thus, the
sexual health aid is also of added value.
In the period of 2011-2016, sexual health aid has also been reported, albeit in
much less detail. The report (MFA, 2017b) was divided into four result areas that go by
the names of: ‘youth, information and choice', ‘health commodities', ‘quality healthcare
services', and ‘rights and respect'. All these four have been labelled as "Results achieved
as planned" (MFA, 2017b, pp. 4, 7, 10 & 12). There were no signs that funding given by
the Netherlands could have been provided by private parties. Thus, this aid can be
considered of added value.
Furthermore, a report on aid from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA, 2017a)
from 2011 to 2016 for water management shows varying results. There were four main
result areas and each had specific targets. Of these four, two met the target and two
underperformed. The main target of the first result area was to increase the efficient
water use in agriculture in Bangladesh. The Dutch embassy in Dhaka labelled it as,
"results achieved better than planned" (MFA, 2017a, pp. 2). In project areas, rice
production went up from 2650 kg/ha in 2012 to 2872 kg/ha in 2016. Fish production
also went up and changed from 763 kg/ha in 2012 to 907 kg/ha in 2016 (MFA, 2017a).
Consequently, both targets were met. Targets in results area 3, which went by the name
of ‘Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)’, were also met. It was assessed as “results
achieved as planned” (MFA, 2017a, pp. 7). Concerning added value, there were no
indications that the above-mentioned projects could have been financed without aid. No
explicit statements about the improvement of people's lives were recorded, but it seems
logical that more food production and better access to water facilities and sanitation
constitute an improvement of people’s lives. The other two result areas failed to meet
the targets and can thus be seen as ineffective. Result area 2, which was about improved
river basin management and safe deltas, had the worst qualification. It was labelled with
"results achieved poorer than planned. The impact was very limited" (MFA, 2017a, pp.
4). The main reason being the poor cooperation between the parties involved (MFA,
2017a). Result area 4, named ‘trade and development cooperation', was labelled with,
"results achieved poorer than planned" (MFA, 2017a, pp. 8). One of the main reasons is
that involvement of Dutch small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was pushed, while
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they were not adapted to the local market, “This makes the country not very [sic] suited
for SME initiatives from the Netherlands” (MFA, 2017a, pp. 4).

Goal Ambiguity
A change in goal ambiguity, the leeway in interpretation of set goals, might be the
explanation for the lower effectiveness of aid in the second period. There were three
Dutch cabinets in power during the period of 2005-2010 and they all had very similar
goals that were clear and not mutually conflicting to a large extent. The first cabinet is
that of Balkenende II who was in power from 2003 to 2006. Its coalition agreement was
a bit special since it was coined as an outline agreement (Rijksoverheid, 2003a) instead
of a coalition agreement and it was later on extended by a declaration of Prime Minister
Balkenende (Rijksoverheid, 2003b). Therefore, both have been examined. In the
coalition agreement, the stated goal is to help poorer countries develop. This is seen as a
moral duty (Rijksoverheid, 2003b). Another goal mentioned is stabilising the
international environment through aid (Rijksoverheid, 2003a, 2003b). Although there
are two main goals mentioned, they are not conflicting because stabilising the world can
be in the best interest of developing countries as well. This might just be a way of
legitimising the high aid budget to the electorate because Balkenende stated that the
budget would stay at 0.8% of the GDP10 during his reign (Rijksoverheid, 2003b). Thus,
there were no conflicting goals. However, both goals are vague because they cannot be
easily measured. Thus, there is some goal ambiguity in the years of 2005 and 2006.
Balkenende III was the next cabinet in line but it was only in power for a few
months and it existed as a placeholder government (PDC, n.d.). It was not formed after
elections but rather after the fall of Balkenende II and it did not publish a coalition
agreement (PDC, n.d.). Balkenende III was succeeded by Balkenende IV, which ruled
from 2007 to 2010. With respects to the overarching goals of aid, it is stated in the
coalition agreement that more attention shall be placed on reaching the Millennium
Development Goals (Rijksoverheid, 2007). Because only one goal is voiced, it is by
default a non-conflicting goal. However, later on, it is also mentioned that the ORET
programme (which focuses on private sector development) will be adjusted to create a
larger target group for the medium and small Dutch enterprises in the developing
countries (Rijksoverheid, 2007). This is a first and moderate revelation of private
interests playing a role in the allocation and form of aid. Private interests have not been
directly stated as a goal in the coalition agreement, but it seems to be at least of some
304

Global Jurnal Politik Internasional 22(2)

importance. The goal of reaching the Millennium Development Goals is more concrete
than the goal of Balkenende II of helping the developing country. It is more easily
measurable and therefore less ambiguous, but it is not clear to what extent the
Netherlands should contribute towards these goals. Thus, under Balkenende IV, there
were no conflicting goals and the goal for ODA has also gotten a little more concrete,
thus there is only a little bit of goal ambiguity for 2007 to 2010.
The second period under analysis, 2011-2016, started when Rutte I succeeded
Balkenende IV at the end of 2010. This cabinet initiated a major policy change (IOB,
2013a). In the coalition agreement of Rutte IV, two main goals are stated. These are the
development of the private sector and reaching the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) (Rijksoverheid, 2010a). The first goal is of special importance. It is
characterised by a change ‘from aid to investments’ (Rijksoverheid, 2010a). According
to the OECD (2012) and the Policy and Operations Department (IOB, 2013a), this
policy change instituted by Rutte I, has meant an increase in the focus on Dutch national
interests. Further evidence for this can be seen in the following translated quote11 from
the coalition agreement, “within the budget for development aid, the room for business
will expand greatly”. This is also noticeable in their policy according to IOB (2013a).
Because Rutte I was a minority government, there was also a parliamentary support
agreement signed with the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid or PVV) in order
to rule. In this agreement, however, development aid is only briefly mentioned in
relation to diverting funds to deal with unwanted migration to the Netherlands
(Rijksoverheid, 2010b). Concerning the vagueness of goals, the extent to which the
Netherlands should contribute to the MDGs is not given and the development of the
private sector is also quite open to interpretation. Thus, compared to Balkenende IV, the
goals for ODA became vaguer and more contradictory, as private sector development
might require trade-offs with advancing the MDGs. Consequently, goal ambiguity has
significantly increased under Rutte I (affecting the years 2011 and 2012).
With the fall of Rutte I, Rutte II came about in 2012. There were no goal
statements in relation to aid in the coalition agreement from Rutte II (Rijksoverheid,
2012). Nevertheless, the year 2012 also heralded a major change in Dutch aid policy.
From that year on, a ministerial post was created, for the first time in Dutch history,
combining the posts for development aid and trade (Rijksoverheid, 2012). This minister
was part of cabinet Rutte II and was put in place in order to “emphasize the importance
of coherence between aid and trade” (Rijksoverheid, 2012). While in addition to the
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numerous benefits for Dutch companies that were put in place in the new Dutch aid
policy, the budget for development aid was also reduced further than under Rutte I
(Rijksoverheid, 2012). These changes point towards the increase in the importance of
self-interests in Dutch aid creates a conflict with the selfless goal of aid. In addition,
since there are no official goals, the goal of aid is ambiguous. Thus, under Rutte II, goal
ambiguity has increased further compared to Rutte I. Goal ambiguity in 2012 to 2015
was therefore high.

Causal Relationship
Finally, the above results can be summarised in Table 5.

Table 5. Overview of results of Dutch ODA to Bangladesh
2005 to 2010

2011 to 2016

Low

Medium

Sexual health

Effective

Effective

Education

Effective

-

Goal ambiguity

Water

-

a

a

Partially effective

a

Note. No or insufficient data.
Source: formulated by the author

The question remains how much of the change in effectiveness can be
contributed to the change in goal ambiguity. To answer this question, it is important to
look at reasons for ineffectiveness. One of the reasons mentioned for ineffectiveness in
Dutch given aid for water management from 2011 to 2016 is the character of the project
area. This concerns one of the two failing result sections, as noted below.
“The progress in specific subsectors (...) has been largely made independent of
the Netherlands bilateral cooperation program. Within the NL development
cooperation program a transition from aid to trade has been pursued within
existing projects (...) with the aim of involving more Netherlands companies in
these [sic] projects and project areas. The results of these efforts have been
limited given the high vulnerability and economical marginal character of these
project areas which makes these areas not very interesting for Netherlands
companies as a market.” (MFA, 2017b, pp. 8).
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This shows that in this particular case, the goal of involving Dutch business
more frequently for political reasons has not been in the best interest of the recipient
country, as was hypothesised. Thus, at least in part, the slightly lower aid effectiveness
in 2011-2016 compared to 2005-2010 can be contributed to a higher level of goal
ambiguity which came to be because of the introduction of more self-interests in Dutch
ODA policy.

CONCLUSION
From the aforementioned discussion, effectiveness of development aid is understood as
such if it improves people's lives, when it fulfils sector-specific targets, and when it is of
added value compared to what the private sector could have provided itself. The aid
literature suggests that aid will be more effective when there is a better policy
environment, it can help after climate disasters strike, political stability, and economic
growth of the recipient country. Concerning goal ambiguity, it is created by vague and
conflicting goals and it has already been proven to be a cause of policy failure in other
policy areas. In general, this research measured the effectiveness of aid, goal ambiguity,
and the conditions for aid to be effective by aggregating relevant statements from aid
evaluation reports and coalition agreements, and by mathematically operating figures
from international or national expertise centres. This research demonstrates that, in
regards to the changes in conditions for effective aid between 2005 and 2016, the
answer is multifaceted. The policy environment and the political stability of Bangladesh
have remained fairly stable over 2005 to 2016, with a small indication that they might
have been better in the 2011 to 2016 period, but this is within the error margin. The
climate was most problematic during 2005 to 2010, which is considered by scientists to
increase ODA’s effectiveness, and the economic growth threshold was best met in 2011
to 2016. While it is hard to weigh the different factors, the evidence from this paper
suggests that while there are some marginal indications aid should have performed
better in 2011 to 2016 in Bangladesh in general, neither period had significantly better
conditions for effective aid than the other did.
An analysis of various documents has shown that Dutch aid effectiveness to
Bangladesh in the period 2005 to 2011 can be considered effective in both the education
sector as well as in the sexual health sector. In the period 2011 to 2016, the aid for
sexual health can also be considered effective. The aid for water management from
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2011 to 2016, however, was only partly effective with half of its subsections reporting
poor or virtually no results. Goal ambiguity up until 2006 was low to non-existent under
Balkenende II. Goal ambiguity increased by a fraction in 2007 to 2010 under
Balkenende IV. When Rutte I was formed in 2010, a turning point in aid came about.
Suddenly, aid was heavily focused on trade and Dutch SMEs’ interests. This gave rise
to a fair amount of goal ambiguity, which increased further under Rutte II. Under that
cabinet, changes in goals were formalised in the creation of a ministerial post that was
responsible for both aid and trade.
This research also demonstrates that poor effectiveness in one of the four
subsections of aid for better water management from 2011 to 2016 named ‘trade and
development cooperation' was fully attributed to an increased focus on the involvement
of Dutch SMEs. Dutch businesses were involved in aid, but they were not adapted to the
Bengali business environment, and this resulted in poor aid effectiveness.
To summarise, under Rutte I and II, the goal ambiguity of the Dutch government
has increased, and this coincided with lower effectiveness of aid in Bangladesh at the
same time. The poorer effectiveness of aid cannot be attributed to a change in
conditions since these have been stable in 2005 to 2016. If one takes in the empirical
evidence from the water management aid into account as well, then there is a basic level
of evidence to suggest the causal model of this research is correct, namely that goal
ambiguity decrease aid effectiveness for the receiver. This has been proven in the case
of Dutch aid given to Bangladesh following the self-interested policy change in 2010.
Ban Ki-moon might have been right when he stated, “all too often, aid is driven more by
politics than by need, undermining its effectiveness” (Ban, 2007, pp. 1) because the
Dutch aid seems to be a prime example of this.

Implications of This Research
To interpret and describe the significance of this research as well as to comment on the
research difficulties, a number of reflections will be given below. Firstly, the findings in
this research have been consistent with the expectations derived from the public
administration literature such as those from Leune (2007) and WRR (2004) and
continuing to explore the concept of goal ambiguity outside of the domestic public
sector might be fruitful for other researchers. Therefore, this concept could potentially
help to explain policy failure in cases where no explanation has been found as of yet.
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Secondly, the comparison between the same and different sectors is not
impeccable and more research on this topic is needed in more complete case studies.
The results in the previous section show that there is a discrepancy between the
effectiveness in the first period and the second period. In the first period, aid for better
sexual health and education has been researched and in the second period, aid for better
sexual health and water management has been evaluated. However, the water
management aid was the aid that was underperforming in the second period whilst the
aid for sexual health was not. The water management aid has not been researched in the
first period due to a lack of reports. Consequently, the comparison between the two
periods is not perfect and rather than giving conclusive evidence, findings of this
research need to be seen as an indication. On the other hand, this research provides an
opening for future researchers to explore the connection between goal ambiguity created
by self-interests and ODA effectiveness further, since there is some direct evidence that
goal ambiguity played a role in the lower effectiveness of the Dutch ODA to the water
sector in Bangladesh in 2011 to 2016.
Finally, policy makers and politicians could benefit of this study and those that
follow in this path by recognising that introducing new goals creates goal ambiguity and
that by the mechanism of trade-offs, the original goal might be compromised. The full
extent of the rise of self-interests in Dutch ODA in the period 2011 to 2016 under a
right leaning coalition with VVD leadership have yet to be fully researched in all ODA
recipient countries. Nonetheless, the evidence from this case study of Dutch ODA to
Bangladesh suggest that an increasing focus of a donor’s self-interests in ODA can
result in increased incidence of policy failure.
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Note:
1

The Bretton Woods institutions are the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, often
mentioned together because of the resemblance in their function and approach. They were created at the
same time in 1944 in a city called Bretton Woods in the USA to help Europe recover economically but
they have since changed their mission and they are now heavily involved in financing developing
countries.
2

GNP, gross national product, is different from GDP, gross domestic product, in the sense that GNP is
about the production of nationals only (those abroad as well) and not about the production in country
(including expats and other non-nationals) like GDP.
His original quote “Consistentie van beleidsdoelen is een noodzakelijke voorwaarde voor effectief
handelen. Als doelen haaks op elkaar staan is de kans groot dat ze elkaar dwarszitten. Het falen van
3
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beleid ligt dan in de doelenkeuze besloten, nog volkomen los van de beleidsinstrumentatie en–
implementatie.” (Leune, 2007, pp. 7).
4

Author’s own calculations based on the sources referenced.

5

Ibid.

6

Ibid.

7

Averages calculated based on figures from the World Bank (2018c). Scores range from 1 to 100, with
100 being the best.
8

Ibid.

9

PEDP-II stands for the second Primary Education Development Project, which is a project funded by the
Netherlands and other donors.
10

This makes the Netherlands one of biggest donors in terms of the GDP share it spends on ODA.

Original quote “Binnen het budget voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking zal een sterke uitbreiding
plaatsvinden van mogelijkheden voor het bedrijfsleven. Ontwikkeling van de private sector zal één van de
speerpunten worden, evenals het bijdragen aan het behalen van de Millennium Development Goals”
(Rijksoverheid, 2010a, pp. 8-9).
11
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